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FinancialFragility and Economic Performance
ABSTRACT
Applied macroeconomists (e.g., Eckstein and Sinai (1986))have
stressed the role of financial variables, such as firm balancesheet
positions, in the determination of investment spendingand output. Our
paper presents a formal analysis of thislink. We develop a model of
the process of. investment finance in which there is asymmetricinformation
between borrowers and lenders about the quality of investmentprojects
and about the borrower's effort. In this model, the costof external
investment finance under the optimal contract is higher,the worse the
borrower's balance sheet position (i.e., the lower his net worth).In
general equilibrium, the lower is borrower net worth,the further the
number of projects initiated and the average quality ofundertaken projects
will be from the unconstrained first—best.
We characterize a "financially fragile" situation as onein which
balance sheets are so weak that the economy experiencessubstantial
underinvestment, misallocation of investment resources,and possibly even
a complete investment collapse. Our policy, analysis suggeststhat,
under some circumstances, government "bailouts" ofinsolvent debtors may
be a reasonable alternative in periods of extremefinancial fragility.
Ben S. Bernanke Mark Gertler
Woodrow Wilson School Department of Economics




Madison WI 537061.Introduction. Given tastes and productive technologies, is there some
sense in which general financial conditions (e.g., financial "stability") exert an
independent effect on the macroeconomy? Policy-makers appear to think so:
Concerns about financial stability are a principal motivation for regulation of
banking and securities markets and are a factor in monetary policy. Applied
macroeconomists, also, have stressed the role of financial conditions (specifical-
ly in most cases, the state of aggregate and sectoral balance sheets) in the
propagation of aggregate fluctuations. In the DRI model, for example, procyclical
movements in the ratio of net worth to liabilities of borrowers feed back into the
determination of real activity; Eckstein and Sinai (1986) claim that this mechan-
ism is in fact important for explaining the volatility of output. Kaufman (1987)
and Friedman (1987) have discussed the implications of the recent buildup of
aggregate and business-sector inside debt for the economy and for economic policy.
Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) have argued that balance-sheet factors
contributed to the severity of the Great Depression.
Recently, the development of models of financial and credit markets which
focus on the assumption of asymmetric information has allowed economic theorists
to begin an investigation of the real effects of financial market imperfections.1
This growing theoretical literature, however, has so far not produced a consensus
on what mechanisms are most central for understanding the interactions of the real
and financial sides of the economy.
Our own work (Bernanke and Gertler (1986, 1987)), like the applied litera-
ture, has pursued the notion that balance sheets are critical. In particular, we
have singled out the net worth positions of borrowers as the key factor. Our
basic argument is as follows: Generally, the more a borrower is able to invest in
1 Recent articles with a macroeconomic emphasis include Smith (1983), Farmer
(1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1985), Mankiw (1986),
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), Calomiris and Hubbard (1986), and de Men
and Webb (1987). For a very general analysis of competitive markets under
asymmetric information, see Prescott and Townsend (1984).—2-
his own 'project1 (equivalently, in the models we have used, the more he is able
to put up as collateral), the less his interests will diverge from the interests
of those who have lent to him. When the borrower has both superior information
than the lenders about his project, as well as the ability to take actions that
affect the distribution of project returns, a greater compatibility of interests
reduces the agency costs associated with the investment process. Thus, if
borrowers as a whole have stronger balance sheet positions (have a higher ratio of
net worth to liabilities) then, ceteris paribus, the macroeconomic equilibrium is
more efficient. In this view, a "financially fragile" situation is one in which
potential borrowers (those with most direct access to investment projects, or with
the greatest entrepreneurial skills) have low wealth relative to the size of their
projects. Such a situation (which might occur, e.g., after a prolonged recession
ora "debt-deflation"2) leads to high agency costs and thus to poor performance in
theinvestment sector and in the economy as a whole.3
The present paper develops the financial fragility theme further. We study
an economy in which entrepreneurs (or, possibly, corporate managers) evaluate
potentialinvestment projects, then undertakethose projects which seem suffi-
ciently worthwhile. Evaluation is costly, with the cost varying across individu-
als. (Individuals with low evaluation costs endogenously become the
entrepreneurs.) An important assumption is that entrepreneurs (who must borrow in
order to finance projects) know more about the success probabilities of the
project they evaluate than do potential lenders. As in Myers and Majluf (1984)
and others, this informational asymmetry introduces an Akerlof (1970) "lemons"
2
The term is due to Irving Fisher (1933); see Bernanke and Gertler (1986)
for an analysis.
3 . Asemphasized in Bernanke and Gertler (1986), the mechanism through which
financial factors affect real activity need not involve credit rationing.
The agency costs of investing could manifest themselves in an increased
cost of capital, for example. We believe economists often incorrectly use
"credit rationing" as a generic term to describe a situation where finan-
cial factors matter. More importantly, whether credit rationing exists is
not key to the debate over whether financial factors matter.-3-
problem in the issuance of securities. This lemons problem (which is more severe,
the lower is borrower net worth) raises the prospective costs of finance and thus
affects the willingness of entrepreneurs to evaluate projects in the first place.
We show that, in general equilibrium, both the quantity of investment spending and
its expected return will be sensitive to the net worth positions of potential
borrowers (i.e., the entrepreneurs). This result is quite robust to a number of
extensions of the model.
The model used here is richer than those of our previous work in a number of
respects. Perhaps most importantly, the framework employed here applies to firms
which may issue a variety of liabilities, including equity as well as debt. In
our earlier papers (and in much of the literature on credit markets and imperfect
information), the analysis is limited to markets in which debt is the only instru-
ment for raising funds.4 Thus, the theoretical link that we establish here
between balance sheet positions and investment is potentially applicable to a
broad class of firms. The approach of this paper also makes it easier to motivate
quantitatively significant real effects for financial factors: Indeed, in this
setting, a decline in borrowers' net worth below an endogenously determined limit
will (in some variants of the model) precipitate a complete collapse of credit
markets and investment.
The paper also contains some novel policy results. The most striking of
these is that, if good entrepreneurs are to some degree identifiable, then a
policy of transfers to these entrepreneurs (akin, perhaps, to the mass "bailout"
of debtors that occurred during the New Deal) may increase output and social
welfare.
A distinction between the preponderance of the literature and our earlier
work is that most authors have simply assumed that borrowing is done via
debt, while we have focused on environments in which debt can be shown to
be the optimal contract form.-4-
Wehave organized the paper as follows: sections 2 through 4 develop the
basic model. Extensions of the model are taken up in section 5. Section 6
discusses optimal policy in this framework, and section 7 concludes.
2. The basic model. This section begins our study of the process of invest-
ment finance. The context is a simple two-period general equilibrium model with
informational asymmetries. The analysis is intended to illustrate the relation
between the net worth-of entrepreneurs/borrowers and the degree to which capital
markets are able to allocate savings efficiently to alternative uses. In
particular we show that, the more that entrepreneurs must rely on external finance
in order to undertake projects, the greater are the agency costs of investment;
and the more likely it is that the economy will suffer from "underinvestment"
(relative to the first-best), or even experience an "investment collapse".
The basic assumptions of the model follow:
A.l. The economy consists of a countable infinity of agents indexed by the
non-negative integers. Individuals have identical preferences but differ in their
endowments and in their "entrepreneurial talent" (see A.2, A.4, and A.9 below).
A.2. There are two periods, an investment period and a consumption period.
At the beginning of the first period (the investment period), each individual i is
endowed with a quantity Wi,0C w.CI,of a nonconsumable input good. During
thefirst period, this endowment may either be "stored" or "invested". The output
of either storage or investment is a consumption good. This good is "eaten" in
the second period.
A.3. One unit of stored endowment yields r unitsof the consumption good.
Thereis no indivisibility, uncertainty, or asymmetric information associated with
thestorage process.
A.4. The investment technology comes in indivisible packets called "pro-
jects". Projects are identical ex ante. No project can be successfully undertak-
en unless it is first evaluated by an individual. (Think of evaluation as—5—
essential to the proper setting up of the project.) Individuals differ in their
entrepreneurial skill, as reflected in their cost of evaluating a project: An
individual of type 0 has an evaluation cost of e(0) units of effort. We assume
that e() is continuous, positive, and nondecreasing. Individual types 0 (which
are given before contracting takes place) are drawn independently from a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. These assumptions imply that, if m is the fraction of
individuals who evaluate projects, p capita evaluation costs can be approximated
m
arbitrarily well by f e(8)dO, and per capita marginal evaluation costs can be
approximated by e(m).5
An entrepreneur (defined to be an individual who evaluates and operates a
project) can evaluate no more than one project during the investment period.
A.5. The process of evaluation yields a probability, p, that the evaluated
project, if undertaken, will "succeed". Naturally, 0 C p C1.The random variable
p is independent across projects and is drawn from a continuous cumulative distri-
bution function 11(p).
A.6. Once the entrepreneur learns the project's quality, as measured by its
success probability p, he decides whether to undertake the project or not. A
project which is undertaken requires exactly one unit of the endowment good as
input.(When each individual's endowment is less than one, this fixed input
requirement makes "external finance" necessary.) A project that is not undertaken
uses no input (beyond the initial evaluation effort); the entrepreneur is free to
store his full endowment or to lend it to other entrepreneurs.
A.7. If an undertaken investment project succeeds (which it does with
probability p), it pays a gross return of R units of the consumption good in the
second period, R >r.If the project fails, it pays zero.6
This uses a law of large numbers result on the convergence of sample to
population distributions. See Theorem 5.5.1 in Chung (1974), p. 133.
6
None of our results depend on the return in the bad outcome being zero, as
opposed to some value less than r.-6-
A.8 The quality of an individual entrepreneur's project (the "p") is private
information. It can also not be publicly observed whether an individual who
claims to have evaluated a project has in fact done so. Individual endowments w.
are observable.7 Also, whether a given project has been undertaken (i.e., is up
and running) and whether it succeeds or fails is assumed to be observable.
We initially assume that the entrepreneur's cost of evaluation (his "skill")
is private information; however, as the scope for policy turns out to be very
sensitive to this assumption, we consider the alternative case as well. The
distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the population and the c.d.f. 11(p) are
assumed to be common knowledge.
A.9. Individuals choose how to invest their endowments and whether to become
entrepreneurs. Each individual's objective is to maximize expected second-period
consumption less effort expended at project evaluation (i.e., individuals are
risk-neutral, and the cost of effort is measured in consumption equivalents.)
Discussion. 1) The nonconsumable endowment w represents an individual's net
worth. Given that project sizes are fixed at unity, a borrower's balance sheet
position (the ratio of net worth to total liabilities) is w/(1-w), which increases
in w. Here, we take w as given; but it is not difficult to make this variable
8
endogenous (see Bernanke and Gertler (1986)).
2) Our modelling of the investment process as taking place in two stages, an
evaluation stage and an operational stage, differs from the standard assumption
that entrepreneurs are endowed with projects (so that there is no evaluation
We could give individuals the ability to "hide" endowment, but it turns
out that in the equilibria studied below they would have no incentive to
do so.
8 We emphasize that net worth is not measured by the total equity the firm
issues, since the latter includes securities held by outside lenders. For
large, publicly held firms our concept of borrower net worth corresponds
best the personal stake of the managers and directors. Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1986) present evidence that managerial stake in many large
corporations is non—trivial.—7—
stage).9 We include the evaluation stage in our formulation both because it is
realistic, and because a two-stage process appears necessary to generate the
intuitive and (probably) practically important result that pervasive informational
problems in a sector may lead to underinvestment in that sector.1°
3) The key assumptions which give rise to the agency problem are: Ci) that
knowledge obtained about project quality is private to the entrepreneur, and (ii)
that it is possible for an individual to. claim falsely to have evaluated a
project. Many alternative specifications that give the entrepreneur the option of
enjoyingsome type of unobservable "on-the-job consumption" at the expense of
outside lenders could have been used in place of Cii);however,some assumption
like(ii) is required to rule out a flat compensation schedule for entrepreneurs
as a solution to the incentive problem introduced by assumption (i).11 It is not
strictly necessary to our analysis to allow project evaluation costs to differ
among individuals. Doing so does add considerable realism and interest to the
problem; it is also a technically simple way to ensure interior solutions (so that
resources are both invested and stored in equilibrium).
4) Assuming that an entrepreneur can process only one project per period
simplifies the analysis without affecting the qualitative results. It is important
for our results, however, that scale diseconomies preclude the entrepreneur from
handling enough projects to completely diversify away the agency problem, as do
financial intermediaries in Diamond (1984).
Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Hargraves and Romer (1986) also analyze
two-stage investment processes in general equilibrium settings.
10 .
DeNezaand Webb (1987) employ a model similar to ours but omit the
evaluation stage, which allows them to obtain an "overinvestment" result.
We elaborate on this issue in section 4.
This differs from Flyers and Majluf (1984) in that we explicitly model the
process by which borrowers obtain information about projects, and in that
we permit contracting prior to informationacquisition.-8—
3. The social optimum without asymmetric information. To provide a bench-
mark against which to measure the effects of information asymmetries, we first
consider the solution to the social planning problem of this economy when there is
no private information.
Let w be per capita endowment; let m be the fraction of individuals who
evaluate projects; and let p* be the reservation success probability (i.e.,
projects with evaluated success probabilities equal to or above p* are to be
undertaken). Then E(p*) is the fraction of evaluated projects that is rejected
(and 1 -H(p*)is the fraction accepted). Let p be the probability that a project




is the average expected return (per unit of endowment invested) to undertaken
projects. Note that, here and below, p is a function of p*.
With risk-neutrality, the utilitarian social planner cares only about expect-
ed per capita consumption, less per capita effort expended in evaluating projects.
Formally, the planner's problem is
m
(3.1) maxr[w -m(1-H(p*))]+ m(1 -H(p*))pR-5 e(8)dO
p*,m 0
where the first two terms are expected per capita returns to storage and to
"accepted" investment projects, respectively, and the final term is minus the per
capita project evaluation effort. Note that the final term imposes the obvious
feature of the optimal allocation that projects are evaluated by the most effi-
cient entrepreneurs.—9—







These conditions are easily interpreted. (3.2) says that the optimal reser-
vation probability is such that the expected return of going ahead with the
project is just equal to the opportunity cost of the required input, if put into
storage. That is, the first-best reservation probability of success fb is given
by fb =rIR.Any project whose evaluated probability of success is greater than
or equal to r/R should, in the first-best, be undertaken; others should be
rejected.
In (3.3), the expression (1 -H(pfb))(;fbR
-r)gives the return, gross of
evaluation costs, to evaluating an additional project. In the planning solution,
this marginal benefit is equated with the marginal cost of evaluating a project,
e(mth). If the e(m) function takes a sufficiently broad range ofvalues12 then
(3.3) will imply an interior solution, i.e., some endowment will stored and some
will be invested.
*
Thedetermination of p and is shown in Figure 1. The vertical line
graphs (3.2), p =r/R.Thecurved line shows gross expected investment return
as a function of p*; note that this return is maximized at p* =rIR.(3.3)
implies that, at the point where the two lines intersect, the effort level e(mfb)
can be read off the y—axis. Since e() is monotonic, knowledge of e(m) implies
knowledge of mth.
12 mustbe positive for some m >0,negative at m =mx
where








Welfare maximization has no implications for incomedistribution in this
setup, since the risk-neutrality (constantmarginal utility) assumption makes the
distribution of the consumption good irrelevant tothe measure of total welfare.
Further, the optimum is independent (as is usuallythe case) of the initial
distribution of endowment. With private information, however, onefeature of the
initial distribution -thecorrelation of endowment with entrepreneurial ability -
willin fact have an important effect on the constrained optimum,as we shall see.
4. The model with asyimnetric information: a decentralizedsolution. We now
re-introduce asymmetric information, as specified in assumptionA.8. It is
convenient to consider first a particular decentralized (competitive)equilibrium
for our model economy, in which zero-profit financialintermediaries sign optimal
contingent contracts with individual entrepreneurs.As noted in A.8, for the time
being we maintain the assumption that individualevaluation costs e(e) are private
informatictfl. For expositional simplicity, we also temporarily imposethe follow-
ing restrictions: (I) Individuals all have the sameendowment, i.e., w. =w,all
i.(2) Entrepreneurs deal with intermediaries only asindividuals; entrepreneuri-
al coalitions are not allowed.(3) Randomized allocations ("lotteries") are ruled
out. The case with observable evaluation costs and the implicationsof relaxing
(l)-(3) are all developed below. Below we will also discussthe relations of the
proposed competitive equilibria to the associatedsocial planner's solutions.
If w C 1, so that individual endowments are less than the inputrequired to
operate a project, entrepreneurs who evaluate projectsand then decide to proceed
must borrow endowment from non—entrepreneurs. We maythink of this borrowing as
being organized by competitive financial intermediaries.(These intermediaries
are convenient fictions; they use no resources
in intermediation and will earn no
profits in equilibrium.) Let us consider nowhow such an inter'nedian' would
behave.—11—
Assuming that there is positive storage inequilibrium, intermediaries are
ableto obtain "funds" (i.e., endowment) atopportunity cost r. The intermedi-
ary's problem is how to structure credit
arrangements with entrepreneurs so as to
maximize expected profits.
Without loss of generality, wemay consider credit contracts of the following
form. Intermediaries sign contracts withentrepreneurs (or potential entrepre-
neurs) at the beginning of the investment
period, before any project evaluations
have been done. Entrepreneurs "deposit" theirendowment w with the intermediary.
They also must give the intermediary the proceeds fromsuccessful projects. The
intermediary promises to fund the entrepreneur'sproject, if he decides to under-
take it, and to pay the entrepreneur aquantity of consumption goods at the
beginningof the consumption period. Thisquantity of consumption goods is
contingent on what happens during the investmentperiod.
If: The intermediary pays: Andtheintermediary's
profit is:
A project is undertaken c R-r(1—w)-C and is successful
A project is undertaken
Cu and is not successful
No project is undertaken C rw-C
Note that the three contingencies on which theconsumption payment is based (as
well as the contingencies in which theintermediary must furnish input or receive
output)are assumed to be distinguishable by the intermediary.Importantly,
though,for the contingency "no project is undertaken", theintermediary cannot
tell whether the entrepreneur evaluated aproject but decided not to go ahead, or
whether he simply did not evaluate in the first place.
The intermediary's contract is a generalcontingent contract in form and
could be thought of as representing a variety of financialinstruments. One-12-
useful way to think of this contract is as a"credit line", in which the
entrepreneur is able to draw workingcapital as needed. In this contract,the net
cost of credit to the entrepreneur depends on
whether he uses the credit line and,
if he does, on whether his project paysoff or not.
4a. The intermediary's optimization problem.For any given contract, letE
be the expected quantity of the consumption goodto be paid to the entrepreneur,
andlet V be the amount of expected consumptionthe entrepreneur can obtain
elsewhere in the economy. (V,whichisexogenous to the intermediary,will be
determined in general equilibrium.) Thenthe intermediary's maximization problem








(4.2) (1 -H(p*))(pC5+ (1-p)C)+ll(p*)C0
=C
(4.3)
(4.4) p*C ÷ (1 —p*)C=C
(4.5) C >C 5—U
(4.6) Cu >0
(4.7) max (C -e(O),rw) C• 0-13-
The intermediary's objective, given by (4.1), isto maximize expected prof-
its. The intermediary's direct control variables (notall of which are
independent) are the contingent payments, C, C, and C, and theexpected
payment, C. Although it is the entrepreneur who actually chooses thereservation
success probability p*, the intermediary can indirectly choosep* (if the
entrepreneur responds rationally) by the values it assigns its directcontrols.
For mathematical convenience, then, we also treatp* as under the control of the
intermediary.
Equation (4.2) defines the expected payment to theentrepreneur, C, in terms
of the state-contingent payments and the state probabilities.
(4.3) is a voluntary participation constraint. It isstraightforward to show
that (4.3) will hold with equality at the optimum;we simply impose this below.
Constraints (4.4) through (4.7) are relevant because of theasymmetry of
information. Equation (4.4) expresses the relationship between thereservation
success probability p* that will be chosen by the entrepreneur and thepayments
offered by the intermediary: p* is the successprobability such that the entre-
preneur is just indifferent between proceeding with the project (which hasexpect-
ed return p*C +(1
-
P*)Cu)and not proceeding (which has return C). The
inequality (4.5) is necessary to ensure that the entrepreneur will undertake
projects with success probabilities above p* rather than below p*.
(4.6) is a non-negativity condition on the consumption of theentrepreneurs;
it is often interpreted as a limited liability condition. Thisrestriction makes
borrower wealth a critical determinant ofagency costs. (See Sappington (1983)).
(4.4), (4.5), and (4.6) together also imply that C >0and C >0.
Constraint (4.7) is an important one. Recall that intermediariescannot tell
if an individual who does not proceed with a project hasactually performed an
evaluation. (4.7) imposes truth-telling: It requires the contract to havethe
property that any individual will prefer either to actually perform an evaluation
(which has expected return -e(O))or simply to store or lend to an intermediary-14-
(with return rw) rather than to claimfalsely that an evaluation hasbeen perform-
ed (which yields C). Since we knowthat in equilibrium not all individualswill
evaluate projects, (4.7) can here be simplified,without loss of generality, to
(4.8) rwC
4b. haracteriZiflg the optimal financial arrangement.We now solve the
intermediary's optimization problem and usethe results to derive several proposi-
tions about the optimal financial contract.First, it is easy to verify that
(4.5) is never binding, so we drop thatconstraint. Next, using (4.4) to elimi-









(4.8)' rw(C -C)+ C
-0 u u
where the left side of (4.3)' is an alternativeexpression for the intermediary's
expected payments. These constraints arewritten in a form that facilitates
thinking of Cu and (C0 -Cu)
as control variables. The objective(4.1) now
becomes




subject to (4.3)', (4.6)', and (4.8)'. Let thenon-negative multipliers associat-
ed with the three constraints bep, W, and y, respectively. The first-order
necessary conditions are
(4.9) (r -p*R)dH(p*)=p(;/p*2)(1-H(p*))(c-C)
(4.10) y =p[(p/p*)(1-H(p*))+ H(p*)]
(4.11) 'P =y
-p
We are now able to show:
Proposition (4.1). The incentive compatiblereservation success probability
for the entrepreneur is less than orequal to the socially efficient level; that
is, p* C r/R ="fbis induced by the optimal contract.
Proof: According to (4.9), p* C r/R ifp0. But p > 0 follows from the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
Q.E.D.
Proposition (4.1) shows the nature of theinefficiency induced by asymmetric
information; namely, that under the optimal contract theborrower may have an
incentive to be insufficiently selective whendeciding whether to undertake his
project. The reasons for this inefficiencyare, first, that the intermediary's
ability to reward entrepreneurs who turn down inferiorprojects is constrained:
Entrepreneurs who do not go ahead cannot be paidso much that it tempts
non-entrepreneurs to claim falsely that they have also evaluated (andturned down)
projects. Second, the limited liability constraint (C >0) restricts the ability
of intermediaries to punish entrepreneurs whoundertake inferior projects.
We now characterize fully theintermediary's optimal contract.-16-
Proposition (4.2). [The optimal contractwhen evaluation costs are
unobservable]
Ci)Ifp c r/R, then the entrepreneur's state contingentpayoffs under the
optimal contract are Cu =OC =rw,and C = rw;further, p* is the
solution to
(4.12) [(p/p*)(l -H(p*))+ H(p*)lrw =V
(ii) If p =r/R,then the state-contingent payoffs are indeterminate;there
exist multiple solutions that satisfy the requirementthat the expected payoff
equals the entrepreneur's opportunity cost.
Proof: Part (i) follows directly from theconstraints on the intermediary's
maximization problem, if the multipliers y and P are positive.So we must show
y > 0, P > 0.(4.9) implies that p > 0 when p* C r/R.(4.10) then implies
y > p0; this together with (4.11) impliesP 0.
When p* =r/R,p =0by (4.9). From (4.10) and (4.11) itfollows that in
this case y =0and 'P =0.Thus the constraints (4.6)' and (4.8)' do notbind.
Since only (4.3)' holds with equality, thereis only one equation to determine C0
and C. Any combination (C, Cu) that satisfies(4.3)' and the inequality
constraints is consistent with the optimalityconditions. This proves (ii.)
Q.E.D.
The difference between the inefficient andefficient cases (p* C r/R and
p* =r/R,respectively) is that in the inefficient casethe incentive constraints
bind, whereas in the efficient case theydo not. In the inefficient case (with p*
"too low"), the intermediary would like to
reward entrepreneurs who are selective
and punish those who are not, but is prevented
from doing so as much as it would—17—
like by the moral hazardconstraint rw )Cand the limited liabilityconstraint
Cu >OThe optimal contract in the
inefficient case goes as far in this
direction as possible bysetting C =rwand C =0.13Thus entrepreneurs who
"fail" receive noconsumption, while those who do notproceed with projects "get
their deposit back". C andp* are then uniquely determinedby the requirement
that entrepreneurs receive theopportunity cost of the marginal borrower,and by
the incentive constraint thatrelates p* to the threecontingent payments.
4c. General equilibrium. Wenow consider the equilibrium of thiseconomy
under competition. The differencebetween general and partialequilibrium is that
V, the expected consumptionpayment required to induce an entrepreneurto sign
with an intermediary, becomesendogenous. The extra condition thatallows V to be
determined is that expected
intermediary profits equal zero. We focuson the
inefficient case, in which p* C r/Rin equilibrium. The efficientcase is simple,
and is discussed below.
Again, let m be the fraction of individuals
who evaluate projects inequilib-
rium. Then e(m) is themarginal evaluation cost. Since e() iscontinuous, in
equilibrium the marginal entrepreneurmust be just indifferent betweenevaluating
a project and storing (or lending) hisendowment. This implies
(4.13) V —e(m)=rw





We emphasize that the resultCu =0does not arise because theproject yields a zero return in the unsuccessfulstate. It occurs because the
limited liability constraint isbinding. If unsuccessful projects did
yield positive returns, then under theoptimal contract the lender(s)
would receive all the proceeds in thebad state; the borrower would still receive nothing.-18-
With free entry into intermediation,
intermediaries must earn zero expected
profitsl4 in equilibrium. Zero expected profits impliesthe equilibrium condition
(4.15) (1 —H(p*))(pR
—r)=e(m) (zero expected profits)
From Proposition (4.2), we also knowthat the incentive-compatible p* satis-
fies the following equation (which is(4.12) re—arranged):
(4.16) (1 -H(p*))(plp*
-1)rw=e(m) (incentive-compatible p*)
(4.15) and (4.16) jointly determine
the equilibrium values of p' and in. We
can now characterize the general equilibrium
solution. This solution turns out to
be sensitive to the value of borrower networth (endowment) w.
Proposition (4.3). [Equilibrium
when evaluation costs are unobservable]
(i) If w C 1, then both p* and investment mare below their respective
socially efficient levels. Further,both p and m are monotonically increasingin
w, assuming an equilibriumwith positive investmentexists.15
(ii) If w =1,then the economy attains the unconstrainedoptimum;
=r/R= and=
mth.
Proof: (1) substitute (4.15) for e(m)into (4.16) to obtain the following
expression for p*:
14Because of universal j-neutralityand the observability of intermediary
profits, we need not worryabout the distinction between zeroexpected
profits and zero realized profits.For example, depositors willbe
perfectly willing to bear intermediaryprofit risk.
15Proposition (4.4) describes the casefor which investment is zero in
equilibrium.—19—
(4.17) p* =[p*/p+ w(l -
Ifw C 1, then [p*/p + w(1 -p*/;)]C 1 and hence p* C r/R. Ifp* C r/R then the
expected gross surplus from investment(1 -}J(p*))(pR
-r)is below its maximum
value; hence e(m), and thereforem, are below the unconstrained social
optimum.
Straightforward differentiation of(4.15) and (4.16) yields > , >
when w C 1, given that both(4.15) and (4.16) hold.
If w =1,then (2.7) implies p' =r/R.Since p* =r/R,the gross expected




Suppose that the unconditional
gross project return (the expectedgross
return if p* =0)is less than the evaluationcost of the most-efficient
1 A
entrepreneur;that is 5pRdK(p)-rpUR -rC e(0). Then there existsa 0
positive level of borrower net worth(call this level w), suchthat, for levels of
net worth w < w, the investment
market "collapses"; no positiveinvestment is
sustainable in equilibrium. Theminimum wealth level w and theassociated success
probability p are the values of w andp* that satisfy the equilibriumconditions





Proof: To see first that w >0, suppose w =0.Then, by (4.16), p* =0.
Then the expected net surplus fromevaluating an investment is ptIR -r-e(0),-20-
which is negative by assumption. Thus there can be no investment if w =0.By
continuity, this is also true for sufficiently small positive w. Hence w > 0.
To see that (4.18) and (4.19) define w and p, compare these equations with
(4.15) and (4.16). Clearly, w is the value of borrower wealth such that only the
most efficient entrepreneur could generate a surplus net of evaluation costs. By
Proposition (4.3), p' and e(m) are increasing in w. Thus if w C w, then
e(m) C e(O). This implies m =0,i.e., investment "collapses" if w C w.Q.E.D.
The possible equilibrium solutions are depicted graphically in Figure 2. The
hump-shaped curve (equation (4.15)) gives the expected surplus from initiating a
project, gross of evaluation effort, as a function of p*; this same curve appeared
in Figure 1. The downward-sloping line (equation (4.16)) gives the relation
between p' and e(m) as determined by the optimal intermediary contract.16 When
w < 1, the equilibrium lies to the left of the socially efficient point E (as
drawn, the equilibrium is at point A), with m and p* below their first-best
levels. (Recall that e(m) is monotonically increasing in m.)
The reason that m is less than the social optimum is that, with w < 1, there
is an agency problem: As we have seen, entrepreneurs have an incentive to be
insufficiently selective when deciding whether to proceed with projects. But,
since lenders recognize this problem, and since lenders are always able to earn a
return of r by storing, this agency cost is reflected only in the equilibrium cost
of capital. The lower expected net return to initiating projects reduces m in
equilibrium.
To see how the equilibrium depends on borrower wealth w, note that increases
in w cause the downward-sloping curve in Figure 2 to move up and to the right.
(As we have seen, for a given e(m), greater borrower wealth leads to a higher p*
under the optimal contract.) As w increases, p* and m approach their first-best
16










levels; that is, the agency problems become less serious. When w =1(full
collateralization), the equilibrium is at point E, the first-best.
In contrast, suppose that borrower net worth w declines so far that the
downward-sloping curve in Figure 2 intersects the hump-shaped curve at point C or
below. In that case, the potential gross surplus generated by initiating a
project is less than the evaluation cost of the most efficient entrepreneur. Here
there can be no positive investment in equilibrium Cm =0);this is the "invest-
ment collapset' described by Proposition (4•4)•l7 The minimal value of w which
permits positive investment, w, is the value of w which causes the two curves to
intersect at point C. Thus, declines in borrower net worth induce a "financially
fragile" situation.
18
There has been some controversy as to whether the presence of asymmetric
informationtypically leads to "underinvestment" or "overinvestment" (deMeza and
Webb (1987)). Our basicresult is that in economies with w < 1,there will be
underinvestmentin the sense that entrepreneurs will initiate too few projects
relative to the first-best, i.e., m C m. For macroeconomic analysis, however,
it is also worthwhile to consider the behavior of investment spending, as measured
by the total resources devoted to investment. Although entrepreneurs initiate too
few projects, they are also insufficiently selective when deciding to proceed with
the projects which they do evaluate (p* c ph), so that investment spending,
m(1_H(p*)), is not in general unambiguously greater or less than in the
17Hankiw (1986) obtains a similar result, which, like ours, is in the spirit
of the Akerlof (1970) "lemons" model. Mankiw's model is rather different
from ours in that he restricts attention to debt contracts and does not
link lenders' payoffs to borrowers' returns. Our paper and Nankiw's both
make a case for government intervention in financial markets, but we
differ in the specific recommendations.
18
In analogy to Nankiw (1986), a collapse is more likely if the payoff to
successful projects R is low and if the riskless interest rate r is high.
This can be seen by noting that the hump-shaped curve in Figure 2 moves up
with an increase in R and down with an increase in r.-22-
first-best.19 Building on the investmentcollapse result, however, we can show
that, for w sufficiently low and for convex e(), there will always be
underinvestment (in the sense that total spending is too low).
Proposition (4.5) [IJnderinvestment or overinvestment?]
Let I =m(1- H(p*)) be the total quantity of endowment devoted to invest-
ment, and let be the first-best value of this variable. If e(m) is convex in
m, then there exists some common endowment level ;, w C< 1, such that
(i) for w C ;, I C I (underinvestment)
(ii) for 1 > w > > tfb (overinvestinent)
Proof. Use (4.15) to define the equilibrium relationship in =m(p*).Implic-
it differentiation of (4.15) yields m'(p*) =(r-p*R)H'(p*)/e'(m).
Since I =m(1- H(p*)), we have=[m'(p*)_mH'(p*)} =
[(r-p*R)/e'Øn)
-m]H'(p*)—, using the expression for m'(p*). Since
Hh(p*) ) 0, — > 0, then 5has the same sign as [(r - p*fi)/e'(m) - ml. We
know that this latter expression is positive at w =w,negative at w =1,and
(given that e() is convex) continuously decreasing in w in the intermediate
range.
Thus is first positive and then negative. Since I =0when w =wand I =
whenw =1,by continuity there must exist some ;, w < w C 1, such that I < 'fb
for w C w and I > 'fi, for w > w. Q.E.D.
19
De Fleza and Webb's (1987) '1overinvestment" result is essentially the same
as our finding that p < p, i.e., given that they have evaluated,
entrepreneurs are too eager to proceed with projects. But this result
depends on the number of evaluations (m) being given exogenously in their
model. When the investment process includes a costly evaluation stage,
entrepreneurs internalize the cost of insufficient selectivity, so that
underinvestment can occur.-23-
The relation of I to 'lb as w changes is shown in Figure 3. The important
point here is that, even if investment doesn't "collapse", a "financially fragile"
situation implies both that investment spending is low and that the investment
which is undertaken is inefficient.
Finally, we may ask who bears the welfare losses associated with financial
fragility. The distribution of expected utility in equilibrium is straightforward
to determine. Non-entrepreneurs receive rw, as does the marginal entrepreneur
(who by definition is just indifferent between evaluating a project on the one
hand and lending or storing his endowment on the other). The inframarginal
entrepreneur's return is the expected consumption payment V, less his evaluation
e(8). By (4.13) this return can be written as
(4.20) V —e(6)=rw+e(m)—e(G)
or, substituting for e(m) from (4.15),
(4.21) V —e(&)=rw+(1-H(p*))(pR
—r)—e(O)
(4.21) shows that all of the social surplus associated with the existence of
investment projects is appropriated by the efficient entrepreneurs in equilibrium;
thus, in this model it is the entrepreneurs who bear the deadweight losses created
by asymmetric information.
5. Generalizations. The last section adopted a number of simplifying
assumptions for expositional purposes. We turn now to a brief discussion of the
effects of relaxing these restrictions.
20
Figure 3 also shows that investment spending will be increasing in
borrower net worth ("procyclical") whenever w is less than the value at





5a. Variable endowments. The analysis of the last section is easily gener-
alized to allow for an arbitrary distribution of initial endowments. The main
modification is that intermediary contracts now depend on the borrower's
endowment. For each w, the form of the optimal intermediary contract is precisely
analogous to the contract described in Proposition (4.2). For example, for the
interesting case where p* C r/R, the contingent payoffs under the optimal contract
are C' =0, =rw,and =rw/p',where the w superscripts and subscripts
indicate dependence on w. Further, in analogy to (4.12), p is given by
* * w
(5.1) EPw/Pw)(1 -H(P))+H(p)]rw =V
where Vw is the reservation expected consumption level required by an entrepreneur
with wealth w.
To calculate the general equilibrium, impose zero expected intermediary
profits contract contract. This implies
* w
(5.2) (1 -H(p))(pR—r)÷ rw =V
Conditions (5.1) and (5.2) uniquely determine p and
Which entrepreneurs will borrow in this equilibrium? The evaluation cost of
the marginal borrower is determined by
(5.3) -e(m)=rw
For any given endowment level w, individuals with evaluation costs less than or
equal to e(m) will borrow, others will not. In analogy to (4.21), the expected
utility of an entrepreneur of type 0 and with wealth w is given by
(5.4) V' -e(0)=rtc+(1- H(P))(PwR_ r) -e(0)-25-
which equals rw for 0 =mand exceeds rw for 0 C at
w w
The basic features of the equilibrium with uniform endowments are replicated
*
here. First, p and in are below the first-best levels for borrowers with w C 1. w w
*
Second, p and m are increasing in w and attain the first-best for w =1.Third,
individuals whose endowments fall below a critical lower bound will be unable to
undertake any investment (their credit will be "cut off").
The equilibrium with variable endqwments also makes clear an important
implication of asymmetric information in this setup: Unlike the first-best case,
here the pattern of initial endowments --inparticular, the correlation of
endowments with entrepreneurial skill --isa determinant of the best feasible
outcome. Twopointsare worth emphasizing: First, in the equilibrium with
variable endowments, it is not necessarily the case that those evaluations which
are done will be done by the most efficient entrepreneurs; rather, relatively
inefficient entrepreneurs with high endowments may displace more efficient entre-
preneurs with lower endowments. Second, pure redistributions of endowment which
reduce the correlation of skill and endowment will tend to reduce output and
investment efficiency.21
5b. Observable evaluation costs. If individual evaluation costs e(0) are
public knowledge, then intermediary contracts will be conditioned on the e(0) of
the individual borrower (as well as on the borrower's w, if that differs among
individuals). It turns out that the intermediary's optimization problem in this
case differs from the case with unobservable e(0)'s in only two respects: First,
the intermediary's controls (p*, C, C, C, Cu) and the reservation consumption
level (V) all become functions of 0. Second, since non-entrepreneurs can be
directly excluded from signing contracts, constraint (4.7) in the intermediary's
problem simplifies to
21 . Greenwaldand Stiglitz (1986) make a related argument.-26-
(55) —e(O)>
(where the B superscript signifies dependence on the borrowerTs type 8), instead
of to (4.8) as before.
For the case p* C r/R, the contingent payoffs under the optimal contract are
8 0 0 0 0 * *
now Cu =0,C =V-e(0)and C =IV-e(0)]/p8,with p0 determined by
* * * 8 8
(5.6) [(p0/p0)(l -H(p0))
+ H(p8)][V -e(8)]=V





For each 8, (5.6) and (5.7) determine the general equilibrium values of p and V9.
V0 is decreasing in 0. This implies that, for any given wealth level w,
there exists some m such that
(5.8) V" —e(m)=rw
Individuals with wealth w whose evaluation costs are equal to or less than the
e(m) defined by (5.8) will borrow in equilibrium; others will not. The expected
utility of an individual entrepreneur is given by an expression exactly analogous
to (4.21) and (5.4).
If we compare the equilibrium with observable evaluation costs to the equi-
librium with unobservable costs (but the same initial wealth distribution), some
interesting results emerge.22 First, the total number of project evaluations and
the reservation success probability of the marginal entrepreneur are precisely the
22These results are only summarized here. Detailed statements and proofs
are available on request.—27—
same in the two economies. Thus, the observability of evaluation costs is not in
itself sufficient to take the decentralized economy to the first-best, or even to
avoid investment collapse, if borrower wealth levels are sufficiently low.
liowever, it is the case that inframarginal entrepreneurs are more efficient when
their e(O)'s are observable than when they are not. This is because, with observ-
able e(O)'s, t is easy for the intermediary to screen out high-e(O) individuals
who would have an incentive to pretend to evaluate and to collect C. Thus the
constraint C Crw,which binds in the unobservable e(O) case, can be relaxed here
* forinframarginal borrowers. The relaxation of this constraint allowsp0 to
increase as 0 falls, i.e., the moral hazard problem is reduced for more efficient
entrepreneurs. Indeed, inframarginal borrowers (but not the marginal borrower)
may attain the first-best reservation success probability= r/R)for w
strictly less than one.
Thus, in general equilibrium, observable evaluation costs may ameliorate, but
cannot eliminate, the inefficiencies arising from the combination of asymmetric
information and imperfect collateralization.
5c. Entrepreneurial coalitions. We have assumed throughout that intermed-
iaries deal with borrowers on an individual basis. However, if individuals can
observe the evaluation costs of others, and if evaluation costs are sufficiently
low, potential borrowers may Eind it profitable to form coalitions.23
To take a simple example, suppose that two individuals each have w =
Theseindividuals might agree to pool endowment and projects, to fund the project
(oftheir two) with the highest success probability (or perhaps to store if
neitherprojectis good), and to share total returns. If the rule for sharing
returnsis independent of whose project is undertaken, then neither individual has
anincentive to mis-report his success probability to the other. At one level at
least, the moral hazard problem is eliminated.
23 . . Wethank Barry Nalebuff for pointing this out to us.-28-
Further elaboration of this example would be worthwhile (e.g., as part of an
explanation of why intermediaries do not diversify away agency risk, as in Diamond
(1984).) Indeed, we did something of this sort in Bernanke-Gertler (1986).
However, we do not find it important to undertake this elaboration here, for two
reasons.
First, the formation of coalitions is itself subject to an incentive problem:
The coalition must ensure that each member has an incentive actually to evaluate
hisproject, and not to "free ride" on the projects' of others. The free rider
problem worsens as the coalition size grows and when evaluation costs are high,
anditislikely to become fatal to coalition formation when evaluation costs are
unobservable (so that non-entrepreneurs are able to free-ride). Thus, as a formal
matter, we can exclude coalition formation for many sets of parameter values when
the e(O)'s are observable, and in almost all cases of interest when the e(O)'s are
unobservable.
Second, since the coalition of two individuals might find that it has two
good projects instead of just one, it will in general want to sign a contingent
contract with an intermediary, in order to allow for possible additional financ-
ing. Formal analysis of this contract suggests that the same sorts of moral
hazard problems will arise between the coalition and the intermediary as arise
between individual borrowers and the intermediary in our basic analysis. Allowing
for entrepreneurial coalitions thus would not seem to affect the qualitative
nature of our results; at most, it changes the fundamental unit of observation
from the individual entrepreneur to a coalition.
Sd. Lotteries. A number of recent studies of models with asymmetric infor-
mation have stressed the importance of allowing for random consumption alloca-
tions, or lotteries, in the analysis; see, e.g., Prescott and Townsend (1984).
Because of our assumption of universal risk neutrality, consumption lotteries
would have no effect on decisions or social welfare in our model. It turns out,
however, that lotteries in endowment (done before evaluations are undertaken) are-29—
potentially quite helpful, at a theoretical level at least, in the present
setting.
Consider the case in which endowments are variable and evaluation costs e(O)
are observable. For a given individual of type 0, expected utility as a function
of his endowment w can be written as
rrw for w >
(5.9) EU9(w) =1 1
—
+ 5 (pR-r)dH(p)-e(0)for w c
where w is the endowment below which the individual cannot invest, and the
expected utility for the case w >wis analogous to the expression given in (5.4).
Note that p* depends on w, and that both p* and w depend on 0. Assume for
simplicity that 5(pR -r)dH(p)is concave in w.24 Then the individual's expected
utility as a function of his endowment is given by the curve OAB in Figure 4.
Note the kink in expected utility at A (where w =w).Note also that the slope of
the curveis r for w Cw,that itexceeds r but is declining in the region w >
andthat it equals r again at point B, where w1.25
Because the expected utility curve is not concave in w, individuals will want
to take fair bets when 0 Cwc w*, where w* corresponds to the point where a ray
from the origin is tangent to the expected utility curve (see Figure 4). By the
usual arguments, the individual's preferred fair lottery is the one thatpays w*
with probability w/w* and zero with probability 1 -w/w*,wherew is initial
wealth. Further, it can be seen from the diagram (or shown algebraically) that:
24
Similar results can be obtained for the non-concave case.
25
The derivative of expected utility with respect to w equals r at point B
since the derivative of the integral term in (5.9) is zero when w =1;at















(1) For a given skill level, w is independent of initial wealth w; i.e. ,all
lottery winners of a given ability will have the same endowment when they sign
contracts with intermediaries.
(2) w* >w;lottery winners will always have enough endowment to proceed with
a project evaluation.
(3) w* c 1; individuals will not attempt to fully collateralize themselves,
26
so that borrowing from intermediaries will occur in final equilibrium.
Finally, it can also be shown that
(4) w* is increasing in e(G); less able entrepreneurs will prefer riskier
lotteries
27
The main way in which the introduction of a lottery modifies our previous
results is that the investment collapse described in Proposition (4.4) is much
less likely to occur; the collapse will be prevented by the "pooling" of endowment
(via the lottery), except in the case where entrepreneurial net worth is zero.
The other results of Section 4 remain qualitatively true: In particular, entre-
preneurs will not be fully collateralized even after the lottery, so that the
basic agency problem remains.28
Lotteries of the sort described here do not seem to occur in practice or to
have obvious institutional counterparts. A possible explanation for this absence
of lotteries is risk aversion, from which we have abstracted. Another possibility
26This is proved by noting that the ray 00 must have a slope greater than r,
while (as noted above) the slope of the expected utility curve at w1
equals r.
27To see this in the figure, note that an increase in e(O) shifts the
humpshaped part of the expected utility line down, which moves the tangen-
cy point 0 to the right.
28
As in Section 5a, itisalso true in the lottery equilibrium that some
projectswill be undertaken by relatively less efficient entrepreneurs
(who happen to win the lottery).-31-
is that the willingness of an entrepreneur to enter lotteries may send an adverse
29
signal (e.g., lack of prudence?) to potential lenders.
The revelation of information by lotteries can also be beneficial, however.
In the version of our model in which evaluation costs are unobserved, it is
possible for the introduction of a lottery to induce a separating equilibrium (in
which entrepreneurs credibly reveal their types by their choices of lotteries),
which Pareto -dominatesthe equilibrium without a lottery. Like the analogous
equilibrium with public evaluation costs, however, this equilibrium does not
attain the first-best.
Se. Summary. This section has considered a variety of extensions of the
basic model, including variable endowments, observable entrepreneurial skill,
entrepreneurial coalitions, and lotteries in endowment. The only significant
modification of the basic results is that, as a theoretical matter, the admission
of endowment lotteries and entrepreneurial coalitions (the latter when the e(O)'s
are observable) may eliminate the "investment collapse" equilibrium. However, the
principal messages of sections 2 through 4 remain qualitatively unaffected: Under
all of the extensions, it remains true that insufficient borrower wealth and the
resulting necessity of external finance lead to too few evaluations and
insufficient selectivity in equilibrium; and that these capital market
inefficiencies disappear only as borrowers' endowments approach the level of full
collateralization of projects.
6. The role of policy. An advantage of the sort of formal setup we have
used here is that normative policy analysis can be done in a straightforward way,
by comparison of the allocations arising in decentralized equilibria with those
implied by the social planner's solution. An earlier version of this paper
(available on request) develops this comparison explicitly. To conserve space, we
29Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) make a similar point in their discussion of the
role of collateral.-32-
here only describe our results. Fortunately, ourprincipal policy Conclusion is
easy to demonstrate without formal apparatus.
An important preliminary point is that, for the classes ofeconomies studied
(e.g., in section 4, for the class in which entrepreneurial skillis unobservable,.
and lotteries and coalitions are excluded), the decentralizedequilibria derived
in sections 4 and 5 are Pareto optima.3° Thus we willnot be able to find a
policy which alters the equilibrium outcome that would receive unanimousapproval.
However, policy will be able to increase social welfare, investmentefficiency,
and output (which, in this context, are all the samething). Also, by definition,
welfare-improving policies are policies that would be unanimously approved if
people could vote before knowing their types (endowments and evaluation costs).
Such policies seem worthy of study, even if they are notPareto-improving.
The critical determinant of the potential effectiveness ofpolicy, it turns
out, is the degree of observability of individual entrepreneurial skills. If
entrepreneurial ability is not observed at all, policy can do little. Perfect
observability of skill levels implies, remarkably, that policy can drive the
economy to the unconstrained social optimum. Intermediate levels of observability
imply, in general, intermediate policy effectiveness.
6a. Unobservable entrepreneurial skill. Consider first .thecase analyzed in
sections 3 and 4, in which entrepreneurial skill (as measured by evaluationcosts)
is unobserved. Endowments may be either identical or variableacross
individuals.31 Thewelfare-maximizing policy may be obtained by solving the
30
The equilibria of sections 4 and S can be reproduced as solutions to
social planning problems, in which positive weights are assigned to the
utilities of those who become entrepreneurs in equilibrium and zero
weights are assigned to the utilities of non-entrepreneurs. The zero
weight assigned to non-entrepreneurs implies that, in the planner's
solution, the non-entrepreneurs' voluntary participation constraints will
be binding; i.e., each non-entrepreneur will receive consumption equal to
exactly r times his endowment, just as in the decentralized outcomes.
31
Throughout this section we exclude coalitions and lotteries, for
simplicity; these extensions can be handled by similar methods, however,
and would not affect the nature of the results.-33—
social planner's problem as done in Section 3, but this time imposing all applica-
ble infonnation constraints. This procedure yields the following results, stated
without proof:
(1) Unless the endowments of all individuals who would be borrowers in the
first-best equilibrium happen to equal one, the first-best outcome is not attain-
able by the planner. Further, the social planner's choices of m and p* are both
below their respective first-best levels, as occurred in the decentralized case.
(2) The solution to the planner's problem and the outcome of the decentral-
ized competitive solution are, however, not identical. The formal analysis
implies that the planner can improve social welfare (relative to the decentralized
case) by imposing a tax on successful investment projects and using the proceeds
to subsidize storage. The reason that the tax is helpful is that it permits a
subsidy to non-entrepreneurs, which relaxes the constraint on what can be paid to
entrepreneurs who decide not to proceed with their projects. Both the loosening
of this constraint and the tax on investments itself tend to raise p*; at the same
time, the tax on investments lowers m in equilibrium. Thus the planner is trading
off a lower number of projects initiated against a higher quality of projects
undertaken.
The policy suggested by this analysis is interesting in one respect, in that
it shows that an investment subsidy (which would be the opposite of the optimal
policy in this case) does not help when the economy is suffering from under-
investment. In the present case, an investment subsidy would raise the number of
evaluations, which is desirable; but it would also reduce the selectivity of
entrepreneurs (i.e., lower p*), leading on net to a decrease in social welfare.
Overall, though, we don't take the tax policy implied by this analysis very
seriously, for several reasons. First, it is very much a "second-order" policy:
If the fraction of the population who are entrepreneurs is small, then the average
subsidy paid to non-entrepreneurs must also be small. Further, as was noted, the
gains in p* achieved by the policy are offset to some degree by reductions in m.-34-
The net welfare effect of this policy, starting from the decentralized solution,
would likely be insignificant.
Second, and more importantly, this policy arises from a somewhat artificial
constraint that we have imposed on the planner -specifically,that he has no
information at all about which individuals (or firms, in reality) are potentially
efficient investors. Because of the assumption that there is no information about
entrepreneurs, the only available policy is one that works through the very
indirect channel of trying to raise the opportunity cost of undertaking ineffi-
cient investments. If we assume (more realistically) that the planner has at
least some information about individual skill, the scope for policy increases
substantially.
6b. Observable entrepreneurial skill. Suppose now that the planner can
perfectly observe individual evaluation costs. As was shown in Section Sb above,
observability of evaluation costs does change the competitive equilibrium somewhat
but is not sufficient to cure the agency problems created by external finance.
However, observability of evaluation costs does have a very dramatic impact on the
capability of the planner. Consider the following simple policy:32 The planner
calculates the value of m, corresponding to the (unconstrained) first—best.
Using lump-sum taxes, he then provides a net subsidy of l-w. to any individual i
whose cost of evaluating projects is e(mfb) or less. The planner's policy thus
fully collateralizes borrowers, which sends the economy to the unconstrained
first-best! This result cannot be achieved by the private economy alone, even by
using lotteries, coalitions, or other devices. The policy works because it
directly attacks the cause of financial fragility, low borrower net worth.
The transfer policy seems to retain at least a degree of efficacy even when
entrepreneurial skills are only imperfectly observed. We have studied a number of
cases. For example, suppose that the planner can tell only whether an individu-
32This policy can be derived as the solution to the planner's problem, but
it is transparent without the aid of formal apparatus.—35—
al's evaluation cost is above or below the marginal evaluation cost in the
first-best. Alternatively, suppose that individuals can pretend to be less
skilled but not more skilled than they actually are (e.g., one can always inten-
tionally fail a test but cannot do better than is given by one's ability). In
either of these cases, it is elementary to show that the planner's "full
collateralization policy" is still feasible and the economy attains the
first-best. Not much is changed if individual evaluation costs are measured with
a random error.
Another example we have analyzed assumes that there is no direct
observability of entrepreneurial skill, but that there is a costly signal that
individuals can emit about their abilities. (In practice, this might involve
undertaking marginally unprofitable projects and incurring debt in order to build
a "track record".) Our working paper proves two results:(1) If the economy is
initially in an inefficient region (p* C r/R), and the signalling costs are not
too large, the planner will generally be able to increase welfare by subsidizing
individuals who signal themselves to be entrepreneurs. (2) However, when there
are signalling costs, it is never desirable to fully collateralize entrepreneurs
(that is, to bring their endowments all the way up to one.)33
To reiterate, our main policy result is that if there is some observability
of entrepreneurial skill (here, evaluation costs), transfers to entrepreneurs!
borrowers may increase financial market efficiency, output, and welfare (although
these transfers will not induce Pareto improvements). Some implications of this
and our other formal results are drawn out in the next and final section.
The reason for this result is that, as m and p* approach their first-best
levels, the additional reductions in agency cost achieved by increasing
the subsidy approach zero, while the marginal signalling costs rise (as
entrepreneurs signal more intensely in order to compete for the increased
subsidy). Thus with signalling it is never optimal to try to eliminate
all agency costs by setting borrowers' wealth at one.-36-
7.Conclusion. Most discussions of financial fragility have focused on
what is often termed the "excessive" buildup of debt (Kaufman (1987)). Our
approach suggests that fragility (or stability) is, at a deeper level, a product
of the level and distribution of national wealth: The financial system is less
efficient, and contributes to inferior macroeconomic equilibria, when potential
borrowers have low levels of net worth. Debt is significant only if it indicates
declining borrower net worth; or if, in the absence of complete indexing, the debt
level creates a potential for large and systematic redistributionaway from
borrowers (e.g., if there is an unanticipated fall in prices). Indeed, because
our analysis assumes contingent contracting and observable returns, our model
economy may be interpreted as a pure equity economy; thus, all our results go
through even in the complete absence of debt instruments.
To what extent is financial fragility important to real activity? Tt seems
to have been at least a portion of the explanation of the Great Depression
(Bernanke (1983)), a period during which debt-deflation greatly reduced the
general level of credit-worthiness. Postwar examples of financially-based prob-
lems having real effects are harder to pinpoint, although casual empiricism
suggests a number of candidates (such as in the agricultural credit crisis; see
Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock (1986)), as well as possible dangers (e.g., deple-
tion of the net worth of banks and savings and loans). Although the empirical
work needs to be done, it is possible that changes in borrower net worth play a
role in the ordinary business cycle: Bernanke and Gertler (1986) show in a formal
setting how real shocks to the economy can be amplified, as declining net worth
during a downswing leads to higher agency costs and lower investment demand.
Finally, this approach may be of empirical relevance in the study of the
apparently close link between financial development and general economic
development: It may be, for example, that an important cause of the primitive and
fragmented state of LDC financial markets is the generally low wealth level of
potential borrowers. Our approach may also explain why the emergence of a-37-
relatively wealthy mercantile class (from which spring credit-worthy
entrepreneurs) has historically been an important pre-condition for the
development process.
As was discussed in the previous section, the most distinctive result of our
formal policy analysis is that, in a financially fragile situation, transfers to
borrowers can improve welfare and increase output. We interpret this as support-
ing the view that, in the face of large and imperfectly provided for shocks to
borrower net worth, debtor "bailouts" by the government are sometimes a useful
alternative to letting the financial system collapse or operate at an inefficient
level.
Conditions like those that prevailed in the U.S. in the 1930's are probably
most conducive to a bailout policy: At that time, those in need of help were
easily identified; the source of distress was clearly systemic rather than
idiosyncratic to individuals; and it could credibly be argued that New Deal "debt
re-adjustments" were a one-time-only policy. Transfers restored the financial
system without excessive signalling costs and without greatly increasing subjec-
tive probabilities of future bailouts (a cost not captured in this one-period
setting).
We emphasize, though, that we do not want to be interpreted as favoring a
generalized and ongoing bailout policy, with the obvious costs that would entail.
The government's decision to help borrowers must balance the short-run benefits to
the financial system against the excessive risk-taking and other inefficiencies
that the prospect of future bailouts creates. Thus, optimal bailouts will be rare
and will be in response only to large, systematic shocks.
The policy of transfers to borrowers might be objected to on equity grounds,
since (according to our analysis) they are not Pareto-improving and tend to help
borrowers at the expense of the rest of the population. This objection is valid,
but we offer two qualifications: First, it is not generally true that transfers
to borrowers involve taking from the poor to give to the rich; the primary-38—
beneficiaries of the New Deal policies, for example, were small and deeply
indebted businesses, farmers, and homeowners. Second, if there are increasing
returns or aggregate demand externalities, then the benefits of a healthy
investment sector may be conferred more broadly than is implied by our simple
model -
Variousextensions of the analysis of this paper are possible. For example,
the implications of this approach for the way we think about standard policies
such as banking regulation, monetary policy, and lender-of-last-resort policy are
interesting, and remain to be more completely explored. An extension that we are
currently pursuing is the multi-period analogue of the model of this paper (i.e.,
we allow entrepreneurs to invest more than once, and to maintain continuing
relationships with intermediaries). The purpose of doing this is to see if
long-term lender-borrower relationships would eliminate or reduce the agency
problem. The basic messages of the present paper seem to be largely unchanged by
this extension: Low borrower wealth reduces the efficiency of the investment
process, and there is scope for government policy. The multi-period model does
yield some interesting dynamics, however. For example, we can show that financial
factors provide an independent source of output persistence; this arises because
current economic conditions affect net worth, which in turn affects economic
performance in subsequent periods.-39—
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